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A RESPONSE TO 
PROFESSOR VERNELLIA R. RANDALL'S 
THE MYERS-BRIGGS TYPE INDICA TOR, 
FIRST YEAR LAW STUDENTS AND PERFORMANCE 
CYNTHIA v. WARD* 
Professor Vemellia Randall's study of the relationship 
between personality type and law school performance address-
es a very current and hotly debated question: Are law schools 
doing the best possible job of educating their students? She 
answers with a clearly articulated "no."1 However, a complete 
answer to this question necessarily engages broader scholarly 
discussions over the role of law schools, and law practice, in 
society. 
Professor Randall sets forth two somewhat different 
complaints about legal education. First, she argues that law 
schools fail to communicate to students the essential elements 
of a successful legal education and to teach them what it 
means to "think like a lawyer."2 Randall attributes her own 
high class rank in law school to the "significant advantage" she 
enjoyed as someone who had previously learned to study 
effectively.3 Randall criticizes "[l]egal education's failure to 
teach skills to [students possessing] varying levels of entering 
abilities;" a failure that effectively requires students to "enter[] 
with sufficiently high levels of the requisite skills so that the 
legal educational system's failures minimally affect on their 
success."4 
Professor Randall's point is that law schools ought to be 
willing and able to offer a successful education to students 
who, unlike Randall and others who do well in the current 
system, do not enter with high levels of such skills. Program-
matically this argument would lend support to calls for more 
remedial programs in the first year of law school, as well as 
greater attention to basic writing, mechanical, and study skills, 
in order to ensure that all students, whatever their entering 
• Professor of Law, Arizona State University; J.D. Yale, 1991. 
1 Vemellia R Randall, The Myers-Briggs Type lndicatur, First Year Law Students and 
Perfarmance, 26 CUMB. L. REv. 63 ( 1995) (discussing author's observations of the "general 
incompetency of the legal education system.") 
2 /d. at 65. 
5 /d. at 103. 
4 /d. at 65-66. 
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level of preparation, have the maximum chance to succeed at 
learning to "think like a lawyer" within the framework of the 
pedagogical status quo. 
Randall's second argument, which appears to be the main 
focus of her piece, can be distinguished from the first. Having 
surveyed a first-year class at Dayton for the purpose of compar-
ing students' scores on the MBTI personality test with their 
first-year grades, she concludes that legal education "favor[s] 
... a particular type"5 of personality (not merely a high level 
of previously acquired skills), namely persons whose scores on 
the Myers-:-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) reveal them to be 
"INTJs"-introverted (as opposed to extraverted), intuitive (as 
opposed to sensing), thinking (as opposed to feeling), and 
judging (as opposed to perceiving) .6 
However, even assuming that Professor Randall is right on 
both counts-that the best law students are those who have 
acquired certain skills before law school, and that students 
with INTJ personality types do better than others-why should 
we care? Mter all, legal education is not an end in itself; it is 
meant, in general, to prepare students for law practice in some 
form. Thus, assuming threshold rules of fairness in law school 
admissions (e.g., the admissions process does not exclude 
minorities on the basis of their race or women on the basis of 
their gender), any argument for changing law school pedago-
gy must be rooted in some claim about the nature of law 
practice-for example, that law school insufficiently prepares 
students for practice as it now exists, or that law practice itself 
must be changed via the acceptance, cultivation, and gradua-
tion of different kinds of students as well as the hiring of 
faculty possessing priorities, goals, and methods that would 
help prepare students to make whatever changes to the 
practice are seen to be necessary. 
The first claim-that law schools should better prepare 
students to take their places in law practice as we know it-has 
been the basis for complaints by the practicing bar and some 
academics that law schools are failing adequately to teach the 
trade. This accusation has recently been set forth in the so-
called MacCrate Report, which charges that legal education is 
too theoretical and should focus less on abstract concepts and 
more on "skills training" and early introduction of students 
5 Id. at 103. 
6 I d. at 102. I evaluate the legitimacy of this conclusion below. 
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into real-world practice situations.' The argument here 
accepts, in general, the existing power and role of the legal 
profession, takes the position that law schools are the setvants 
of law practice as it now exists, and concludes that legal 
education ought more effectively and efficiently to serve the 
current needs of the bar. 
The second claim-that law practice must be changed and 
that law schools can and should play a part in changing 
it-engages feminist, critical race theory, and critical legal 
studies critiques of legal education. Scholars in these areas 
worry that the law and lawyers are serving elitist and oppressive 
roles in society at large, and they would like to use law-school 
education to change this.8 Feminist scholars, for example, 
have charged that the legal profession is essentially "male" 
insofar as it celebrates adversarial process; abstract, rational 
thought; and impartial judgment, while explicitly or implicitly 
disparaging the more relational, particularistic, and empathic 
7 Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, American Bar Association, 
Repurt of the Task Furce on Law Schools and the Profession: Na7TOWing the Gap, Legal Education 
and Professional Deve/Qpment-An Educational Continuum (Chicago, 1992) [MacCrate 
Report]. The task force included six Jaw professors, eight deans, seven practitioners, and 
five judges. Jonathan Rose, The MacCrate Repurt's Restatement of Legal Education: The Need 
for Reflection and Horse Sense, 44 J. LEGAL Eouc. 548, 550 n.10 (1994). Professor Rose 
points out that the MacCrate Report is the latest in a long series of studies of law-school 
education and skills training. Rose, supra at 549, nn.6-7 (listing other well-known 
studies). Professor Rose notes that the "heart and soul" of the MacCrate Report is its 
Statement of Fundamental Lawyering Skills and Professional Values, which lists ten 
fundamental lawyering skills that, the report concludes, law schools ought to emphasize 
more strongly. Id. at 552-53. 
In two recent articles judge Harry Edwards has advanced the claim that "many law 
schools-especially the so-called 'elite' ones-have abandoned their proper place, by 
emphasizing abstract theory at the expense of practical scholarship and pedagogy." 
Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between LegalBducation and the Legal Profession, 
91 MICH. L. REv. 34 (1992). Law-school education, charges Edwards, has become too 
theoretical and should refocus its energies on training students for practice and on 
hiring and developing law faculty who wish to do "useful" scholarship, "not to fight ivory-
tower conflicts that are irrelevant to the outside world." Id. at 38. See also Harry T. 
Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession: A 
Postscript, 91 MICH. L. REV. 2191 (1993) (further developing this argument). But see 
Derrick Bell & Erin Edmonds, Students as Teachers, Teachers as Learners, 91 MICH. L. REv. 
2025 (1993) (worrying that judge Edwards' recommendations will disadvantage scholars, 
especially minority scholars, whose theoretical work raises important fundamental 
questions about the structure of Jaw in our society). 
8 See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Excluded Voices: New Voices in the Legal Profession 
Making New Voices in the Law, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 29 (1987) ("The story of law in the 
United States is largely a story about one group of people, middle to upper class white 
males ... making law for all others in society.") See generally Duncan Kennedy, Legal 
Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy, 32 J. LEGAL Eouc. 591 (1982); Duncan 
Kennedy, How the Law School Fails: A Polemic, 1 YALE REV. L. & Soc. ACTION 71 (1970). 
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thinking that is characteristic of women.9 These scholars have 
advocated structural changes in the profession including a de-
emphasis on competitive "win-lose" adjudication and more 
reliance on noncombative acljudicatory methods such as 
mediation.10 They have also recommended that legal educa-
tion offer more opportunities to students who want to learn 
about such methods. 11 Similarly, critical race theorists have 
argued that the legal profession is insufficiendy diverse and 
have criticized law schools for failing to recognize and cultivate 
minority students and faculty who will bring new perspec-
tives--especially the perspective of economic and social 
disadvantage-to a profession they see as composed too 
heavily of society's elite.12 Some of these arguments draw on 
the foundational work of critical legal scholar Duncan Kenne-
dy, who has repeatedly accused law schools of reproducing 
and reinforcing social hierarchy via the instillation in students 
of corrupt values. 13 
Professor Randall's arguments for reform of legal educa-
tion necessarily rely upon one or another of these foundation-
al assaults on the law and legal practice. Why, for example, are 
law schools wrong to insist that entering first-year law students 
already possess a high level of certain basic skills? The discus-
sion above makes clear that several answers are possible. First, 
making unjustified assumptions about students' entering level 
of skills might result in graduating law students who are 
9 See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Porlia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Women s 
Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S LJ. 39 (1985); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The 
Comparative Sociology of Women Lawyers: The "Feminization • of the Legal Profession, 24 
OSGOODE HALL LJ. 897 (1987); Robin West, jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1 (1988). 
10 See generally Leslie Bender, Feminist (Re)Torls: Thoughts on the Liability Crisis, Mass 
Turts, P(lWer, and Responsibilities, 1990 DUKE LJ. 848; Ruth Colker, Feminism, Theology, and 
Aburtion: T(lWard Love, Compassion, and Wzsdom, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1011 (1989); Menkel-
Meadow, supra notes 8-9; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary 
Culture: A Tale of Innovation Co-opted or "The Law of ADR," 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1 (1991). 
11 See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Women as Law Teachers: Toward the "Feminization • of 
Legal Education, in EssAYS ON THE APPLICATION OF A HUMANISTIC PERSPECilVE TO LAW 
TEACHING 16 (1981); Menkel-Meadow, supra notes 8-10. 
12 See, e.g., Derrick Bell, The Supreme Court 1984 Term, Foreword: The Civil IUghts 
Chronicles, 99 HAR.v. L. REv. 4, 39-57 (1985). See generally Derrick Bell, The Final Repurt: 
Haroards Affirmative Action Allegury, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2382 (1989}; Richard Delgado, The 
Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil /Ughts Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 561 
(1984) (charging that minority scholarship on civil rights issues is ignored by "inner 
circle" of white males who dominate the field). For a discussion of the advantages to law 
of minority viewpoints, see Mari Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the 
Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989). 
13 See generally Kennedy, supra note 8. 
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unprepared for the rigorous writing and analytic demands of 
law practice. Here the argument dovetails with that of the 
MacCrate Report and would lead to the conclusion that more 
basic skills and practical exercises ought to be offered at law 
school in order more quickly and effectively to assimilate law 
students into practice. However,justice-based arguments of the 
kind that concern feminists and critical scholars might also 
ground this type of recommendation. For example, due to 
systemic societal disadvantage, it may be that women and 
minorities who possess top-level intellectual abilities are 
nevertheless relatively less well-trained, at pr~law educational 
levels, than are white males. If this is the case it might become 
a matter of justice, not merely efficiency, for law schools to do 
their part in remedying this unfair treatment by making 
available to female and/ or minority students training in the 
basic skills required to function successfully in the law. 14 
The important thing to note here is that proposals to 
reform law school education via more skills training are 
necessarily based upon some fundamental claim about the 
nature of law practice. 
Similarly, Professor Randall's second line of attack on legal 
education-that it unjustifiably favors persons whom the MBTI 
test would label introverted, intuitive, thinking, and judg-
ing-can also be employed in ways that either serve the legal 
status quo or would lead to dramatic reform of the legal 
system at large. Suppose it is true that legal education dispro-
portionately rewards a certain type of personality. Again, why 
should we care? One reason might be that other, non-INTJ 
personality types-those that gravitate toward extraversion, 
sensing, feeling, and/ or perceiving15-are equally (or more) 
capable of "thinking like lawyers" and of successfully practicing 
law as we know it. If this were true then a preference for the 
INTJ type over the ESFP16 type would reflect an error in 
judgment that ought to be remedied in order to produce the 
best possible set of practicing attorneys within the current 
system of law. 17 But an argument of this kind necessitates the 
14 Professor Randall appears to adopt this view. See Randall, supra note I, at 66 n.4. 
15 See generally Randall, supra note I, for definitions of all the elements of the Myers-
Briggs Type Indicator. 
16 In MBTI terminology, the acronym "ESFP" stands for Extraverted (as opposed to 
· Introverted), Sensing (as opposed to Intuitive),.Feeling (as opposed to Thinking), and 
Perceiving (as opposed to Judging). See Randall, supra note I, at 75. 
17 See, e.g., Lani Guinier, et al., Becoming Gentlemen: Women s Experiences at One Ivy League 
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development of a strong connection between personality style 
and success at law practice-a connection Professor Randall 
never establishes.18 
At a more revolutionary level one might argue that legal 
education's favoring of INTJs results in a legal system that 
helps maintain the domination of elites over the poor, women, 
and/ or minorities. If white males, for example, tend dispro-
portionately to possess INTJ personalities while women and 
minorities tend to fall into other categories, then the effect of 
favoring INTJs over others would be to privilege white males. 
Urging law schools to make room for other kinds of people 
might then be a matter of remedying systemic iftiustice in the 
law. Although Professor Randall does not explicitly draw them 
out, certain parallels between relational feminist arguments for 
law reform and the elements of the MBTI test might be very 
relevant here. For example, if it is true, as Randall hypothesiz-
es, that legal education currently favors "intuitive" personalities 
over "sensing" ones, this could imply a bias toward abstraction, 
toward rewarding students who prefer to deal in abstract 
generalities rather than "personal, concrete experience. "19 
Similarly, if law school (and practice?) favors "thinking" 
students over "feeling" ones, this might imply a bias toward 
impersonal, syllogistic thinking as opposed to thinking that 
prioritizes human relationships, compassion, and the centrality 
of individual values. 20 Some feminist scholars would add that 
these biases have the effect of disadvantaging women-who, 
Law Schoo~ 143 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 85-86 (1994) ("The law school's definition oflawyering 
potential-as measured by a single evaluative methodology and a dominant pedago-
gy-may simply be outmoded in light of contemporary professional developments, which 
include alternative dispute resolution, emphasis on negotiation rather than litigation, 
and client counseling") (footnotes deleted); "[C]ooperative approaches to negotiation 
not only are common in forums that emphasize mediation and alternative dispute 
resolution, but also are associated with traditional advocacy." ld. at 96. 
18 Beyond her merely conclusory statement that law practice needs all personality 
types, see Randall, supra note 1, at 103. 
19 /d. at 88, 90 ("intuitive law students tend to do well in law school because they excel 
at theoretical topics and abstract theories"); I d. at 90 (identifying the "cognitive style" 
of sensing law students as "staying connected to practical realities around them" and the 
"study style" of sensing law students as "approaching abstract principals and concepts by 
distilling them out of their own personal, concrete experience"). 
20 /d. at 91 (Noting that "thinking" law students are "syllogistic and analytic," and that 
they "are likely to undervalue . . . the importance of human relationships in legal 
problems ... and the art of communication."). "Feeling" students, on the other hand, 
"need to be encouraged to keep that perspective," which focuses on the "human angle" 
of law, "attending to relationships," and "personalizing issues and causes they care 
about. n /d. at 92, 93, 95. 
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whether because of socialization or biology, tend to emphasize 
relationships, communication, the personal, and the practical 
over impersonal, syllogistic abstraction. 21 Such critics would 
conclude that, as a matter of equality and justice, law schools 
must open themselves to new ways of thinking and learning. 22 
Professor Randall's results offer little support for the idea 
that law school systematically advantages white males over 
women and persons of color. Consider the breakdown across 
the four sets of opposing preferences that comprise the MBTI 
test Randall gave to the first-year class at Dayton. The test 
revealed that 51.3 percent of the students surveyed were 
extraverts, while 48.7 percent were introverts.23 That is, the 
class appeared almost evenly balanced between introverts and 
extraverts. The gender breakdown showed that 57.8 percent of 
female students were extraverts, compared to 46.7 percent of 
males-a difference that Professor Randall notes is not 
statistically significant.24 Similarly, 52.9 percent of students of 
color were extraverts, compared with 51.1 percent of 
whites-again, a difference that is not statistically signifi-
cant.25 
This even-handed breakdown was repeated along the 
Sensing-Intuitive dimension, where 48.1 percent of students 
preferred sensing, compared with 51.9 percent who preferred 
intuition. Among students of color, 52.9 percent preferred 
intuition over sensing, compared with 51.8 percent of whites; 
21 See, e.g., Lani Guinier et al., supra note 17, at 3 (finding "strong academic 
differencesM between male and female law-school graduates, with men performing 
significantly better than women overall); "All women have finally been welcomed into 
the Law School's hierarchy, but it seems that a significant number are welcome to stay 
at the bottom. The combination of highly visible, competitive pedagogical strategies in 
large first-year classrooms, peer hazing, and an institutionalized emphasis on replacing 
emotions with logic and commitments with neutrality may be sufficient to socialize many 
students into their place, even those who are trying to resist.M ld. at 71 (footnotes 
omitted). "These data plead ... for a reinvention of law school, and a fundamental 
change in its teaching practices, institutional policies, and social organization." I d. at 
100. 
22 It is probably important to note that the sort of group-based personality assignments 
necessary to these arguments have come under increasing disrepute for making 
illegitimately "essentialist" judgments about the viewpoints and characteristics of women 
and minorities while ignoring the differences between group members. See, e.g., Angela 
P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 581 (1990). 
However, relational feminists continue to do important work both in legal theory and 
in practice-related scholarship. See generaUy supra notes 9-12. 
2.!1 Randall, supra note 1, at 80. 
24 /d. 
25 ld. 
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and 55.6 percent of males preferred intuition compared with 
46.9 percent of females; again, neither of these differences was 
statistically significant. 26 
With respect to the Thinking-Feeling preference set, 77.9 
percent of students overall preferred thinking, while 22.1 
percent preferred feeling. Among the males surveyed, 82.2 
percent preferred thinking, compared with 71.9 percent of the 
females; and 94.1 percent of students of color preferred 
thinking, compared with 75.9 percent of whites. Once again, 
neither difference was statistically significant.27 
Finally, the judgment-Perception preference set produced 
somewhat different results along the gender dimension. 
Overall, 67.5 percent of students preferred judgment, com-
pared with 32.5 percent who preferred perception. Of the 
students of color, 64.7 percent preferred judgment over 
perception, compared with 67.9 percent of whites (not a 
statistically significant difference); but the male-female 
breakdown did yield a statistically significant difference, with 
78.1 percent of females preferring judgment, compared to 
60.0 percent of males.28 However, Professor's Randall's results 
indicated that "[s]tudents preferringjudging had higher mean 
FSGPA (2.568) than students preferring perception 
(2.523), "29 and although this difference was not statistically 
significant, "[t]he students' ... Uudgment-Perception] con-
tinuous scores decreased as their first semester grades in-
creased. That is, the more the student preferred judgment, the better 
the student performed. "30 
26 ld. at 86. 
27 /d. at 91-92. 
28 ld. at 96-97. Professor Randall notes that the proportion of women law students 
preferringjudgment is substantially higher than the percentage of women generally who 
do so. Relational feminists would undoubtedly see this as a significant fact; if, for 
example, it is "woman's nature" to prefer perceiving to judging, law schools may be 
disserving women by preferring those who judge to those who perceive. However, this 
immediately calls forth the standard arguments against relational feminism. What, for 
example, are we to say about the first-year female law students who, by a significant 
margin, prefer judging to perceiving? Are they not "real" women? But if your definition 
of a "woman" is "someone who looks at the world in a relational, communicative, 
perceiving (as opposed to judging) way,c then many biological females are not women, 
while at least some biological males are (see Randall's results re: males who were 
relational, etc.). In short, you are not talking about feminism anymore; you are simply 
arguing for equal opportunity for relational, communicative folks. For further discussion 
of that argument, see infra. 
29 ld. at 97. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
50 ld. (emphasis added). The difference was not statistically significant. 
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I am neither a psychologist nor a statistician and will 
therefore not attempt to evaluate Professor Randall's method-
ology, the appropriateness of her choice of the MBTI test over 
other personality tests, or the applicability of her findings to 
students at other law schools. However, to the extent her 
results do have general applicability they do not appear to 
support claims that law-school education has the effect of 
disadvantaging women and minorities. Randall's results 
indicate that, along three of the four dimensions evaluated, 
race- and gender-based differences were not statistically 
significant. Further, along the fourth dimension-that of 
judging v. perceiving, a statistically significant difference did 
exist between men and women, with women significantly more 
likely than men to prefer judging. However, as Randall 
notes, 31 judging seems to be at least a somewhat favored 
thinking style in the current law-school system, so this differ-
ence would, if accurate and generalizable, work to the 
advantage of women. 
All of which serves only to highlight the significance in law 
school of personality differences considered apart from race 
and gender. In other words, if it is true, as Professor Randall's 
findings suggest, that INTJ's are favored over other personality 
types in law school, should we care about this independently 
of race and gender questions? The answer to that question, of 
course, depends on what one expects law schools to be and to 
accomplish. Is it the obligation of law schools, for example, to 
make available a legal education to every person who wants 
one? Or are there legitimate ways of screening out some 
students in favor of others, either by denying admission to 
some or by styling the law-school learning environment so that 
certain kinds of persons will do better than others?32 If so, 
how do we decide whom to screen out; that is, what screening 
criteria are legitimate? As the discussion above has indicated, 
these questions are not answerable without some agreed-upon 
conception of law school's proper relationship to practice, and 
the proper nature of law practice itself. Those who seek 
51 ld. at 97-98. 
52 Professor Randall argues that the MBTI should not be used for admissions purposes, 
since it does not measure or account for all the qualities that determine a particular 
individual's law-school success. ld. at 102. But, if her results are reproduced and become 
applicable to all law students and law schools, it is hard to see the justification for not 
using them-in conjunction, of course, with all other legitimate factors used in the 
admissions process-to help gauge each prospective student's potential success in law 
school. 
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merely to obtain students better prepared to practice law as we 
know it might be well satisfied with the idea that it takes a 
certain type of personality to do well in the legal profession, 
and might want to use Professor Randall's data to seek more 
accurate ways of identifying INTJs and recruiting them to law 
school. On the other hand, those who feel that law school 
should be preparing students to make law less adversarial, 
hierarchical, and competitive, and more nurturing and 
relational, will care very much that legal education rewards 
and (to some extent) molds students into persons who prize 
qualities such as impartiality, syllogistic logic, and abstract 
generality over the more relational, communicative, particular-
istic approach that might make our law practice more commu-
nitarian and more attuned to the voices of the most disadvan-
taged. While Professor Randall's results offer an opportunity 
to address the core question of whether we need basic reform 
of law practice, they do not, by themselves, offer an answer to 
that question. 
